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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether title to land is secure in England & Wales when registered under the Land Registration Act 2002, in particular when a title is registered without the proprietor being able to establish good title under pre-registration rules of property law.
Design/methodology/approach - This paper analyses reported judgments, with particular emphasis on the decision in Walker v. Burton (2012)
Findings – The paper identifies an uncertainty at the heart of the registration system: the uncertainty as to the extent to which a registered title may be rectified to remove the proprietor. This is acute when it appears that the registered proprietor has no claim to the land other than by reason of his registration. There may be a difference in this regard between intangible property titles and tangible titles.
Originality/value – The Land Registration Act 2002 is meant to replace registration of title with title by registration. The real force of this is only now being realised and there are few reported judgements, and less consistency, working out what this means in practice.
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No case typifies the impact of land registration under the Land Registration Act 2002 than the recent and fascinating decision in Walker v. Burton.​[1]​ Managing to combine reflections on the feudal origins of modern land law, with an application of the statutes Quia Emptores 1290​[2]​ and the Land Registration Act 2002, the case spans the centuries. It reminds us that the principles of land law with which we are so familiar today are the product of organic growth that reflected the reality of land use rather than some pre-designed grand plan. It also deals with a difficult and controversial aspect of land registration – the circumstances in which the register can be rectified – and in so doing provides guidance on the interpretation of Schedule 4 to the 2002 Act, a Schedule that will become increasingly important as the real force of title registration under the 2002 Act becomes apparent.​[3]​ In the Report which led to the 2002 Act, the Law Commission put the matter starkly: “[t]hese changes will necessarily alter the perception of title to land. It will be the fact of registration and registration alone that confers title”.​[4]​ Walker v Burton tests this to the limit and puts the 2002 Act in conflict with our pre-registration notions of title and with the ancient feudal principle nulle terue sans seigneur,​[5]​ the Crown’s ultimate right of dominium through conquest. It also illuminates several vital aspects of the 2002 Act as well as dealing with everyday matters of land registration that are so important in practice.

The Case
Ireby Fell in Lancashire was part of an ancient Manor. It comprises some 362 acres of moorland adjacent to Over Hall Farm. The Lordship of the Manor of Ireby had existed since the late 11th Century​[6]​ and might have been held by the Knights of St John of Jerusalem in the 13th Century. However, the Lordship had dropped out of sight until it was assumed by the then owners of Over Hall Farm in the 18th Century. The Hall itself was now (and had been since 2000) in the registered freehold proprietorship of Mr Burton and Miss Bamford, and on 10 October 2003 they also had become first registered proprietors of the Lordship or Manor​[7]​, or reputed Lordship or Manor, of Ireby. It is not clear whether this “Lordship registration” was procured because of the impending entry into force of the LRA 2002 on 13 October 2003, but certainly under the 2002 Act it is no longer possible to register lordship titles, although those already registered may remain so.​[8]​ In February 2005, Mr Burton and Miss Bamford also became first registered proprietors of Ireby Fell itself, having persuaded the Land Registry that this land was either desmense land of the manor or manorial waste. In fact, the Fell had never been conveyed to them, and its ownership had been in doubt for many years, but in essence Mr Burton and Miss Bamford claimed to be entitled to the Fell because it was land of the manor and they were registered proprietors of the Lordship of the Manor. 
	Unsurprisingly, the registration of Mr Burton and Miss Bamford as proprietors of the Fell caused outrage among some of the inhabitants of the surrounding villages, especially as the Fell appeared to have been managed for many years by the local community without incident or problem. Although the evidence established that the new proprietors did not seek to exclude the local community from the Fell or from exercising rights and privileges customarily enjoyed, the proprietors did start to exercise active control, including the erection of signs and the issuing of additional shooting and grazing licences as they saw fit. In due course, several members of the local community challenged the registration of Mr Burton and Miss Bamford as proprietors of the Lordship and of the Fell. There was, of course, no challenge to their registration as proprietors of Over Hall Farm. The challenge took the form of an application to close the registered titles of the Lordship and the Fell, which in terms of the Land Registration Act 2002 amounted to an application to “rectify” the register, this being a proposed alteration which would (allegedly) correct “a mistake” and that would (certainly) prejudicially affect the title of a registered proprietor.​[9]​ As a potential rectification, rather than a mere alteration, the application fell within Schedule 4, para 6 of the 2002 Act, a difficult provision which already had been the subject of consideration by the Court of Appeal in Baxter v. Mannion.​[10]​ 
	
Before the Adjudicator
On referral to the Adjudicator,​[11]​ a preliminary question arose as to whether the applicants had locus standi to apply to close the proprietors’ two titles, given that the applicants were not alleging that any of them had any property rights to the Fell and that their claim to an interest in the Lordship was extremely tenuous. In essence, this was an application by persons descriptively “interested” in the disputed registrations, but it was not a classic application for rectification by a person who had appeared to have lost a proprietary right of their own by reason of the registration of another – as was the case in Baxter v Mannion. This had caused difficulty before, and in Wells v. Pilling Parish Council​[12]​ it had been conceded that an applicant seeking rectification had to show some interest in the land affected before the application could proceed. In a carefully reasoned decision, Adjudicator Cousins in the preliminary hearing in this case declined to follow Pilling.​[13]​ The Adjudicator noted that the issue in Pilling was whether the closure of Mr Wells’ registered possessory title raised a matter of public or private law and, having held that it was the latter, the Parish Council conceded that it had no standing. In technical terms, therefore, Pilling did not determine what was necessary to have standing to make an application for alteration/rectification of another’s title, but rather the nature of a land registration dispute. Consequently, Adjudicator Cousins felt able to look at the matter afresh and this is particularly significant as the Land Registry had flip-flopped in its policy: first requiring the applicant to have an interest in the disputed land before an objection to another’s registration could be made (being its position under the 1925 Act and continued when the 2002 entered into force), then removing the requirement, only to re-instate it after Pilling. However, Adjudicator Cousins’ view was that because the 2002 Act did not expressly require an applicant to have an interest or alleged interest in the land affected, no such requirement could be read into the Act or Rules. In his view, there were safeguards against unmeritorious applications because the Registry could dismiss groundless applications and because, under s. 77 LRA 2002, a person could not object to an application without “reasonable cause”.  Whether this rejection of a formal standing requirement will result in an increase in applications to rectify against a proprietor is uncertain, and clearly there is a fear of “busy body” or malicious applications. However, perhaps these can be dealt with under the safeguards that Adjudicator Cousin’s identifies and, as this case shows, it will not always be the case that the people genuinely most interested in a registration issue – here the local population – necessarily claim the land or a proprietary right in it for themselves. Had the villagers not been able to make an application, the registered proprietors would have been unchallengeable – as nobody else was claiming ownership of the Fell​[14]​ - and given the conclusive nature of proprietorship registration, Adjudicator Cousin’s decision is pragmatic and in the public interest. It reflects a view that registration is now constitutive of title and, as such, that there must be public and professional confidence in the system. The decision was followed in Mann v Dingley,​[15]​ both by the Adjudicator and on appeal​[16]​ and Land Registry practice has reverted to the position that an applicant is not required to establish that some proprietary right or interest of their own is affected in order to make an application to alter the register.​[17]​ Provided that the Registry is astute to deal with frivolous applications, and that the Adjudication system is not overrun by consequential appeals, this is a welcome clarification.

Registered Lordship Titles: a ghostly guarantee?

After extensive analysis and a detailed historical survey, Deputy Adjudicator Brilliant in the substantive hearing from which the present appeal was made,​[18]​determined that Mr Burton and Miss Bamford could not establish any pre-registration right to the Lordship title. It had not been conveyed to them, nor had they had succeeded to it by adverse possession (incorporeal hereditaments being unable to be adversely possessed​[19]​), nor was title acquired by prescription (no evidence and Quia Emptores 1290 intervenes to prevent the grant, fictional or otherwise, of a new Lordship), nor was there an estoppel claim (inter alia, no detrimental reliance). In all likelihood, the Lordship had become extinct as an independent hereditament around the seventeenth century and had reverted to the Crown or Duchy of Lancaster as feudal overlord. Consequently, their registration as proprietors was “a mistake” within Schedule 4 para.5 to the 2002 Act, giving the Registrar the ability to order rectification of the Register by closing the Lordship title, which he duly had done. There was no appeal on this point - but the decision of Deputy Adjudicator Brilliant illustrates important aspects of the rectification process and, perhaps surprisingly, that state guarantee of title is relative according to the type of title held. 
	Once the “mistake” had been identified, the decision whether to alter the Register and close the Lordship title required an answer to two questions: first, what type of alteration was it; and secondly, if the power to alter was available, could it and should it, be exercised? On the first point, it is clear that the application to close the Lordship title amounted to a “rectification” – being an alteration that would prejudicially affect the title of a registered proprietor, see para.60, Deputy Adjudicator’s final judgment, applying Schedule 4 para.1 to the 2002 Act.  Secondly, therefore, if the proprietor of the impugned title was in “possession” of an estate “in land”, the ability to rectify the register was constrained by the need to show the proprietor’s consent, fraud or lack of proper care in relation to the mistake or that it would be unjust not to rectify the register - see Schedule 4 para.6. These are discussed more fully below because the Adjudicator determined both that a Lordship was not an estate “in land” and that the proprietors were not in “possession” of it. Hence, the power to rectify was not constrained and, applying Schedule 4 para. 6(3), the application to alter “must be approved, unless there are exceptional circumstances which justify not making the alteration”. There were no such circumstances and the Lordship title was rectified – it was closed and the former proprietors deprived of their previously guaranteed title.
	The twin conclusions that the Lordship title was not an estate “in land” and that the proprietors were not in “possession” of it, might raise eyebrows, and although both are tenable within the terms of the LRA 2002, perhaps the conclusions are not entirely secure. When the Lordship title was registered, it certainly was “land”, being registered under the LRA 1925 and falling within the definition of land in that statute (s.3(viii) LRA 1925). Consequently, if it is not now “land”, the registered proprietors (and all other pre-2002 Act proprietors of registered lordships) must have been deprived of their “land” and the protection that comes with it by the 2002 Act - a rather startling conclusion that is unlikely to have been intended. Further, although Deputy Adjudicator Brilliant says that manors were deliberately removed from the definition of land (citing para 3.20 of Law Commission Report), in fact the Report says (in para 3.21, not 3.20) that they should be removed from the category of registrable titles, which, with respect, is not the same thing. Indeed, section 132 LRA 2002, the definitional section relied on by the Deputy Adjudicator, says that land “includes (a) buildings and other structures, (b) land covered with water, and (c) mines and minerals, whether or not held with the surface”. Clearly, there are many more things that are “land” than simply these three things and there is no doubt that this definition is not meant be exhaustive (it “includes”). In fact, were it exhaustive, then a freehold estate of a field (for example) would not be “land” for the purposes of the LRA 2002! Thus, while the Deputy Adjudicator’s decision on this point was made no easier by the rather opaque sections of the LRA 2002, it is not certain that a manor is not “land” for the purposes of the LRA 2002, even if it is most certainly not a registrable title
	Likewise, although s.131(1) LRA 2002 does state that “land is in the possession of the proprietor of a registered estate in land if it is physically in his possession”, it is arguable that that this definition of “possession” feeds off the change in the meaning of a registrable estate, rather than is meant to be exhaustive of “possession” for all purposes. Of course, the Deputy Adjudicator is justified in concluding that a person cannot be in “possession” of a manor per se under this interpretation, and perhaps the fault is in the drafting of the Act, rather than in the interpretation of the Deputy Adjudicator. But, if one follows the logic of the section, a manor which incorporates no land​[20]​ can never be “in possession” of a registered proprietor, and so can never gain the additional statutory against rectification, because under paragraph 6(3) such a rectification “must” be ordered following a mistake “unless there are exceptional circumstances which justify not making the alteration”. In this case, there were no exceptional circumstances, but as Panton v Todd illustrates, this is a substantive question that must be argued fully. Panton concerned a mistake in relation to boundary strip of which the proprietor was not in possession – so similar to the Lordship title in this case – and Morgan J determined that the consideration of “exceptional circumstances” without which the register “must” be rectified required consideration of the affect on both parties of ordering, or not ordering, rectification. In his view, enforcing the general policy of the LRA 2002 to uphold the title of registered proprietors (e.g. by not ordering rectification) was not a compelling factor. It depended on the situation of the particular parties in the case, not the general policy of land registration and “[i]n particular, I am unable to accept that rectification of the register is contrary to the policy of the 2002 Act, in the way that he suggested.”​[21]​ In the result in Panton, Morgan J remitted the matter to the Deputy Adjudicator, but it is clear that a judge cannot assume that rectification “must” be ordered against a proprietor not in possession without addressing their mind to whether exceptional circumstances do exist.
In relation to the Lordship title in Burton, it appears that there may have been an assumption that exceptional circumstances did not exist, but in fairness the point appears not to have been argued fully before the Deputy Adjudicator. At present, the effect of Burton might be that a mistake in the register concerning a lordship title will nearly always result in an alteration of the register and that existing registrations are, in effect, vulnerable to all pre-registration defects. It is only if there are exceptional circumstances that rectification can be refused, because they cannot be “in possession”.​[22]​ If this is the case, for lordships “title by registration” is illusory. While this may not be important in a great number of cases, it illustrates that not all registered proprietors are as secure as they might believe and not all titles are as conclusive as s.58 LRA 2002 might suggest. It also illustrates that the LRA 2002 has established a critical difference between proprietary rights which may be possessed and are “in possession” and those which are not. The former enjoy, it seems, considerably more protection than the latter.

 Registered freehold titles: a cast iron guarantee?

Title to the Fell had never been conveyed to Mr Burton and Ms Bamford. They were registered as its proprietors in 2005 on a separate application, probably because they persuaded the Land Registry that s. 62(3) Law of Property Act 1925 applied which deems manorial land to be conveyed along with a lordship of the manor.​[23]​In simple terms, they ended up being owners of the Fell because they owned the Lordship title and without the Lordship title, they could have no pre-registration claim to the Fell. Consequently, and one might think obviously, if title to the Lordship was closed, surely it must follow that title to the Fell also must be closed, the latter being parasitic on the former? But, the land registration system under the 2002 Act does not work like that because registration is meant to be far more than simply a record of an existing entitlement. It is not even proof of an entitlement. Rather, it is the entitlement and not lightly to be disturbed. We have left behind old notions of title and ownership.​[24]​
	Therefore, because s.58(1) of the LRA 2002 says that registration is conclusive of title, irrespective that the proprietors might be thought to have no “right” to the Fell, the only way that they could be denied was if the register could be altered (in this case “rectified”) because of a mistake. There was indeed a “mistake”, but that of itself is not necessarily sufficient to justify rectifying the register. Consequently, the initial, and critical, decision for the Deputy Adjudicator was whether the registered proprietors were in “possession” of the Fell, as this would trigger the protective provisions in Schedule 4 para.6(2). The Deputy Adjudicator had determined that they were, and on appeal to the High Court, there was an issue about whether the question of possession could be pleaded at all given the course of the proceedings. However, without going into this in detail, Deputy High Court Judge Jeremy Cousins QC determined that there was ample evidence for both the Deputy Adjudicator and him to conclude that the proprietors were in possession. While he accepted that the LRA 2002 required the proprietor to demonstrate physical possession,​[25]​ he was mindful of the meaning of “possession” elucidated by Slade LJ in Powell v McFarlane​[26]​ in the context of adverse possession. Thus, bearing in mind the nature of the Fell as open moorland, physical possession was established by the granting of licences and the erection of signs indicating that it was under private ownership. Indeed, it was important that the proprietors had acted as occupying owners, and that no-one else had done so, even if others had been using the Fell for their own purposes for many years. This is, of course, essentially an evidentiary matter,​[27]​ but it does confirm that the meaning of possession varies with the context,​[28]​ and that the LRA 2002 does not require the proprietors to be in exclusive possession, or to have maintained exclusive use, or that all others need to be prevented from exercising limited rights. The finding of possession triggered the protective provisions of para.6(2) Schedule 4 para.6(2), rather than the presumption of rectification in non-possession cases in para.6(3) - rectification cannot be made against a proprietor in possession unless they consent, or they have by fraud or lack of proper care caused or substantially contributed to the mistake, or that it would for any other reason be unjust for the rectification not to be made. These are critical provisions of the LRA 2002 and how they are interpreted and applied will determine whether the Law Commission is right that we now have title by registration, rather than registration of title.
	Of course, the registered proprietors in this case would not consent to the rectification, and few will, so the original applicants first argued that the proprietors had by lack of proper care​[29]​ “caused or substantially contributed to the mistake”. As made clear in the High Court in Baxter v Mannion,​[30]​ this has to be properly pleaded and is not to be regarded as a trivial matter. In this case, it boiled down to an argument about whether the proprietors had acted appropriately in securing registration of the lordship title given the uncertainties surrounding its existence. Two points are worthy of note here. First, that the applicants sought to unpick the conveyancing history of the lordship, and whether the manor remained annexed to the lordship, in order to show that the proprietors should have picked up defects in the title and thus realised that their registration of it was unsafe. This was dismissed on the facts, but there is a point of principle here too. Factually, the Deputy Adjudicator and the Deputy High Court judge were clear that the registered proprietors and their legal advisors had behaved properly and professionally, noting that there was also a de minimis rule so that not every error can be said to have contributed to the mistake within the meaning of para.6(2).​[31]​ The matter of principle is, perhaps, more important. The very point of land registration is that the Registrar needs to be satisfied about the registration, albeit on the documents provided by the applicant. Thus, provided that the applicants have not lied, nor misrepresented their position or hidden material defects, interpreting “lack of care” in the broad manner suggested by the applicants would place a high (and time clogging) burden on applicants’ legal advisers as well as contradicting a fundamental principle of land registration: that title once checked by the Registrar – who after all can raise concerns and reject applications – is guaranteed. This was alluded to in Burton, with the Deputy High Court judge unimpressed with the argument that more care was needed from legal advisers lodging lordship applications because of an entirely speculative (and without foundation) suggestion that this was not within the expertise of the Registry. This bears repetition and emphasis: it is for the Registry to validate and check titles, and this is the raison d’être of land registration in our system. As Mann J said in Sainsbury's Supermarkets Ltd v Olympia Homes Ltd,​[32]​and followed in this case, “the Registry could make up its own mind". Absent improper conduct by the applicants, registered title is guaranteed and the “proper care” provisions should not be interpreted so as to circumvent this.
The second point is that counsels’ argument and the judgment largely were directed towards lack of care in the registration of the lordship title, not the title to the Fell itself. One can see the apparent logic here – that the Fell was registered only because the Lordship was – but one might well argue that the LRA 2002 requires lack of proper care in the registration of the title that is being attacked, not a complimentary title. In essence, it depends on whether the words “alteration affecting the title of the proprietor” in Schedule 4, para. 6 mean “the title” for which rectification is sought, or whether it means any title of the proprietors that might have an impact on the impugned title. It is not altogether clear that the latter meaning – the one argued in Burton – is correct. However, it is reminiscent of the argument accepted in Baxter (in connection within the meaning of “a mistake”) that a mistake in an initial registration infects all consequential registrations. So, in this case, the lordship registration and the Fell registration were viewed as one event rather than as separate events. Likewise in Baxter where a mistake about the facts on which registration as an adverse possessor was built, was held to taint all later registration dealings, even though those later dealings were entirely proper within the scheme of the 2002 Act. The same approach is found in Ajibade v. Bank of Scotland plc,​[33]​ where the Deputy Adjudicator took the view that an initial mistake justified rectification of all consequential registrations, even if innocently and properly made (such as a mortgage) and this was itself followed in Knights Construction (March) Ltd v Roberto Mac Ltd​[34]​ and again (without challenge by counsel) in Panton v Todd. However, not only were these cases concerned with only one substantive title, whereas Burton was concerned with two, the Baxter rationale (that an initial mistake taints all subsequent transactions) has not been applied consistently. The opposite view was taken in Barclays Bank v Guy​[35]​ and Stewart v Lancashire Mortgage Corporation​[36]​where rectification of consequential registrations was not ordered.  
Necessarily, once it is determined that an initial mistake, or an initial registration, affects all linked transactions, the ability to rectify the register becomes broader and deeper, and title guarantee less robust. As cases like Ajibade and Knights Construction illustrate, it means that an innocent third party (mortgagee and purchaser respectively) cannot rely on the conclusiveness of the register despite s.58 LRA 2002. It is not arguable that this defeats one of the prime objectives of the LRA 2002. There will, of course, be different views about this, but whether one favours a stronger registration guarantee and a narrower rectification jurisdiction (e.g. by limiting the definition of “mistake” and not seeing all transactions as linked) or a wider rectification jurisdiction and a necessarily weaker registration guarantee (e.g. by seeing registration as a process which is tainted if there is an initial problem),​[37]​ what we really need is clarity and consistency. In the recent Cherry Tree Investments v Landmain Ltd,​[38]​a majority of the Court of Appeal​[39]​made the point that rectification of a registered document (i.e. not the register itself but something like a registered charge containing specific lender’s powers) can take effect only from a point in time that was consistent with the priority rules of s.28 and 29 LRA 2002, and not from the earlier date that the original (now rectified) document was first registered. The reason? To protect third parties who might rely on the registered document as conclusive. The majority favoured a pro-registration, certainty of title analysis, Arden LJ in the minority preferred to rely on substantive law as it would have applied absent registration principles.​[40]​The inconsistencies are piling up,​[41]​ and it is crucial to be clear about when the register is conclusive, even in the face of error and mistake, and when it is not. 
	Having determined that there was no fraud or lack of proper care, the only other ground that the register can be rectified against a proprietor in possession is if it would otherwise be unjust not to rectify. This was the ground on which Henderson J in the High Court in Baxter was prepared to rectify the register against the new registered proprietor in possession following his mistaken, but successful, claim of adverse possession.​[42]​ The telling point for Henderson J was that “it is clear that Mr Baxter was never entitled to be registered as proprietor of the Field, and in my view simple justice requires that, in the absence of strong countervailing factors, Mr Mannion should now be able to regain title to his property.”​[43]​ He continued that Mr Mannion should be able to “regain title to his property”. The Court of Appeal did not consider this point at length, beyond commenting that when Henderson J said it was a matter of simple justice for Mr Baxter to regain his land, “And so it was”.​[44]​ 
Undoubtedly, the conclusion in both courts in Baxter was influenced by the realisation that the factual basis for the adverse possession claim simply did not exist, and there was much background noise about the accuracy of the evidence Mr Baxter had submitted in support of his initial application. However, the language in the case implies strongly that it is unjust not to rectify simply because the land really belonged to someone else. In other words, that ownership is to be determined by substantive pre-registration property rules and that registration should reflect, or mirror, the “real” ownership. As Jacob LJ put it in his opening remarks in Baxter, “Does the machinery of the Land Registration Act 2002 allow a party to take someone else's land by operation of a bureaucratic machinery which trumps reality?"​[45]​However, this underplays considerably s.58 LRA 2002 and Baxter does not explain what extra is needed to make it “unjust” other than that it would have been different if the land had not been registered. This was certain to cause problems, and they arose in Burton, where both the Deputy Adjudicator and the Deputy High Court judge refused to rectify, even though there had been a mistake, because there was nothing to make it “unjust” not to rectify.  Of course, one point of difference between the two cases is that in Burton there was no other party to the dispute claiming ownership, and this made it less controversial to uphold the title of the “mistaken” proprietor. But, it is not the case there was no other possible owner of the Fell. Indeed, absent Mr Burton and Miss Bamford’s registration, ownership of the Fell would fall to the Crown (or Duchy of Lancaster) as feudal overlord and Jeremy Cousins QC was concerned that the Crown’s and Duchy’s case had not been pleaded before the Deputy Adjudicator, although both had expressed their disinterest by the time of the appeal to the High Court.​[46]​ 
	The Deputy Adjudicator in Burton had addressed the “unjust” issue relatively briefly, and Baxter had not then been decided, but in determining that it was not unjust not to rectify, he made a number of salient points: that the registered proprietors had expended money on the Fell; that the local Parish Council (who previously had been instrumental in the Fell’s management) did not support the application to rectify; that no-other person was claiming title; and that it was not unjust simply because a proprietor had obtained a significant amount of land for little or no consideration. Indeed, in his view it would serve no useful purpose if rectification was ordered and it might even be unjust to do so. These are significant points as they recognise that registered proprietorship brings responsibilities as well as rights and that a proprietor who has observed those responsibilities should gain credit thereby. In the High Court, Jeremy Cousins QC was obliged to revisit the matter in the light of counsel’s submissions on the application of Baxter and because it was clear that the Fell might indeed have another owner. Nevertheless, he too found that it was not unjust not to rectify. First, there was no suggestion in this case that the registered proprietors had been selective in the evidence they had sent to the Land Registry (unlike Baxter); and secondly, and “more importantly,”​[47]​ that there was no “dispossessed” who would suffer if rectification was refused. 
	
Conclusion
It is perhaps unwise to draw general conclusions from a relatively small sample of decided cases,, and perhaps unsafe to do so given that “unjustness” must at some level be dependent on the facts. But, it is not altogether clear that it is wise to draw a distinction between cases where there is a dispossessed owner claiming rectification (unjust and so rectification is made against a proprietor in possession - Baxter) and one where there is not (not unjust, no rectification - Burton). Most cases will be like Baxter, not like Burton, and if it is weighty (i.e. making it unjust) to show that there is someone else claiming to be the “true” owner, then registration is not a guarantee of title, it is merely evidence of a good title until challenged. Burton itself notes that it is up to the person seeking rectification to establish that it is “unjust” and perhaps we should focus on the effect on the registered proprietors if a rectification is made, rather than the effect on the person seeking rectification if it is not. There should perhaps be a public interest element also: not only (but not least) a public interest in having a stable, state guarantee of title, but a public interest in maximising the use of a scarce resource. So, the Deputy Adjudicator in Burton in focusing on the position of the registered proprietors, who acted in reliance on their registration and who were prepared to actively manage the land, may well point the way forward. Actually, this is consistent with Baxter, for focusing on the position of the new registered proprietor in that case (who had built his claim on a false premise), rather than on what the old proprietor would lose, would still lead to a decision to rectify.​[48]​ If one focuses on the “loss” to the former proprietor, one is in real danger of importing pre-registration notions of ownership into land registration and certainly this sees land registration as evidence of an existing title, rather than the source of the title. By focusing on the new proprietor, and how rectification would affect them, with a glance towards the public interest, one at least ensures that there is a presumption in favour of upholding the state guarantee of registered title found in s.58. We should also remind ourselves of the statutory language: rectification may be ordered not when it is just to do so, but when it is not unjust. This surely indicates that there is a presumption against rectification when a proprietor is in possession and that we must look to the position of the new registered proprietor in assessing the “unjustness”, for it is they who will lose what the statute guarantees they have.​[49]​ If we concentrate on the person claiming rectification we necessarily, and wrongly in my view, concentrate on pre-registration principles of property law and ignore the fact that 2002 Act is meant to replace registration of title with title by registration. That said, it remains true that there is not widespread acceptance that “title by registration” has arrived. The challenging ratio of Fitzwilliam v Richall Holdings Services Ltd​[50]​ - with its explicit reliance on Malory Enterprises Ltd v Cheshire Homes (UK) Ltd​[51]​ - that a registered title might actually be no more than a mere legal shell that can be removed from a proprietor without engaging the rectification provisions at all is based on the premise that the Register reflects underlying pre-registration property principles, rather than replaces them. 

The challenges facing the Land Registry and the Adjudicators (and now the Judges in the Property Chamber) in interpreting the alteration/rectification provisions of the 2002 Act should not be underestimated. The provisions are not entirely easy to decipher, and they are not dealing with easy matters. Ownership of land goes to the core of personal wealth and security and evokes strong emotions. It raises economic questions as to the certainty of security interests and the stability of commercial lending. Hopefully, the question of who has standing has now been settled, although what counts as “land” under the 2002 Act has been surprisingly limited. In addition, property lawyers have a tendency to regard what happens “on the ground” as more important than what the register says. Jacob LJ strikes a loud chord when he wonders if anyone would favour bureaucratic machinery which trumps reality? Yet, Burton and Baxter do illustrate very different approaches. Together with Panton, they indicate that there is a real difference in the protection for a registered proprietor in possession and one that is not. Richall, on the other hand, indicates that possession is not a guarantee of certainty even for those innocently defrauded. The difficulties for the Land Registry in reconciling these diverse approaches are evident in the cases considered here and we should not forget that most registration applications do not raise complex issues. They need certainty
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^3	  See, for example, Paton v. Todd [2012] EWHC 1248 (Ch).
^4	  Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century, A Conveyancing Revolution, para. 1.10. And see Cherry Tree Investments Ltd v. Landmain Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 736, where this principle was instrumental in the decision of the majority. But contrast the result at first instance in Fitzwilliam v Richall Holdings [2013] 1 P & CR 19, (2013) 129 LQR 320.
^5	  Roughly, no land without a lord, expressing the concept of title through service to the Crown or superior lord.
^6	  It appears to have been held by Earl Tostig, ex-King Harold’s brother, at the time of Doomsday Book in 1086.
^7	  Although a form of property of ancient origin, “lordship” titles today rarely carry any rights or land with them. However, they may have residual value of an undiscovered nature, as in this case. 
^8	  Lordship titles are no longer within the class of titles which may or must be registered. See also s.119 LRA 2002, power to remove manors at the request of the proprietor.
^9	  LRA 2002, Sched. 4, para.1.
^10	  [2011] 1 WLR 1594. See also [2011] 75 Conv.  331.
^11	  The office of the Adjudicator to HM Land Registry was abolished with effect from 1 July 2013. The judicial functions, and personnel, were transferred to the Property Chamber of the First-Tier Tribunal. There is no change to the jurisdiction, which remains to resolve disputes concerning the application of the Land Registration Act 2002 and the Land Registration Rules.
^12	  [2008] 2 EGLR 29.
^13	  REF/2007/1124, given on 14 May 2009. Available on the Tribunals’ Judiciary website.
^14	  The Crown and Duchy of Lancaster seemed disinclined to intervene.
^15	  REF/2010/0582.
^16	  Judge Mc Cahill QC sitting as a High Court Judge, 21st July 2011, transcript at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWLandRA/2011/2010_0582.html.
^17	  Land Registry Practice Guide 39, April 2012.
^18	  It was “lengthy and careful”, Burton Judgment para. 16
^19	 Except for tithes and rent charges, see Limitation Act 1980 s.38(1)
^20	  Might it have been different if the Fell had not been registered as a separate title, but was comprised within the lordship title itself?
^21	  Panton judgment para.87.
^22	  Perhaps, for example, where the registered proprietor has paid a large consideration for the lordship.
^23	  A Stinting Agreement of 1836 supported the view that Fell remained with the manor.
^24	  Or perhaps not, see Fitzwilliam v Richall Holdings Services Ltd ([2013] EWHC 86 (Ch)) which appears to accept the validity of pre-registration notions of title, regarding the Register as merely a reflection of what has occurred already. Consider Lees, (2013) 76 MLR 62; Dixon, (2013) 129 LQR 320
^25	  As above, s. 131(1) LRA 2002, and confirmed in Land Registry Practice Guide 39.
^26	  See (1977) 38 P & CR 452, Ch D. See also Red House Farms v Catchpole [1977] 2 EGLR 125.
^27	  So, in Panton v Todd, Mr Todd was held not to be in possession and outside the protection of para.6.
^28	  For example, see [2010] 74 Conv. 423
^29	  There was no allegation, nor evidence, of any fraud.
^30	  [2010] 1 WLR 1965.
^31	  “I accept the proposition in the passage mentioned in Ruoff and Roper to the effect that this requirement should not be read narrowly, and that the protection afforded to a proprietor should not belost if the mistake were barely above the de minimis level. Ultimately, whether a lack of care substantially contributed to a mistake will be largely based on impression gleaned from all the circumstances”,  Burton Judgment para. 95.
^32	  [2006] I P&CR 1.
^33	  [2008] REF/2006/0163/0174.
^34	 .[2011] 2 E.G.L.R. 123. The judge made the point that the Adjudicator had been correct to find that the 2002 Act had not changed the law in this respect. Pinto v Lim [2005] EWHC 630 (Ch) is similar.
^35	  [2008] EWCA Civ 452. Without deciding the matter, Lord Neuberger ventured that he could see the force of the Ajibade and Baxter view in an appeal on a procedural matter in Barclays Bank plc v Guy (No2) [2011] 1 WLR 68. There is an excellent analysis in Sex, Lies and Land Registration (2012), part of the ten old square 2011/2012 seminar season, at http://issuu.com/keithplowman/docs/seminar_notes_sex_lies_and_land_registration_feb_2?mode=window&pageNumber=14.
^36	  REF/2009/0086 & 1556
^37	  On the whole, I favour a strong role for registration and limited power to rectify, this being one of the reasons why the 1925 Act was replaced by the 2002 Act. That e-conveyancing remains an unrealised dream does not mean that we can ignore the point of the 2002 Act. 
^38	  [2012] EWCA Civ 736.
^39	  Longmore and Lewison LJJ, Arden LJ dissenting.
^40	  See also a similar stance interpreting the 1925 Act in Mallory Enterprises Ltd v Cheshire Homes Ltd [2002] Ch 216.
^41	  Park Associated Developments v Kinnear, Document AC9701047 11 April 2013, follows Richall in challenging the conclusiveness of the title register.
^42	  As is well known, the original registered proprietor (and person seeking rectification) had failed to respond within time to the Registrar’s notice advising him of a claim to his land.
^43	  Baxter, High Court Judgment para.63.
^44	  Baxter, Court of Appeal judgment para.41. The Court of Appeal was more concerned with whether there had been a relevant mistake – there had been- and where lay the onus of proof.
^45	  Baxter, Court of Appeal judgment para.1.
^46	  Burton Judgment paras. 102, 103, 136.
^47	  Burton Judgment para.130.
^48	  See also Sainsbury's Supermarkets Ltd v Olympia Homes Ltd [2006] 1 P. & C.R. 17 where, in a case where there were multiple registration mistakes, an analysis of the conduct of the new registered proprietor meant that it was unjust not to rectify.
^49	  As Jeremy Cousins QC himself says in relation to the Fell, “[d]eprivation of an interest in land is always liable to be at least potentially material when considering the question of whether it is unjust for an alteration of the register not to be made for the purposes of paragraph 6(2)(b) of Schedule. Also, had it mattered, the Deputy Adjudicator in Panton v Todd would have held that it was not unjust not to rectify.
^50	  [2013] EWHC 86 (Ch) and see above fn.24 An appeal is pending for July 2013.
^51	  [2002] Ch. 216.
